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UNITED STATES V. KIRKALDIE:1 TO RECOGNIZE OR NOT TO
RECOGNIZE UNCOUNSELED TRIBAL COURT
CONVICTIONS?
Madison Mattioli
I. INTRODUCTION
In February of 2014, a grand jury returned an indictment charging
William Kirkaldie with domestic abuse by a habitual offender under 18
U.S.C. § 117(a),2 a federal statute enacted to promote safety for Native
American women.3 Congress enacted Section 117 to address the issue of
assault in “Indian Country” by attaching “a federal penalty to the
commission of a domestic assault when the actor has had at least two
prior, similar convictions in another jurisdiction.”4 The prior convictions
can arise from state, federal, or tribal court.5 Kirkaldie pled guilty to two
prior charges of domestic violence in tribal court without an attorney,
and had served jail time as part of these prior convictions.6 In granting
the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, Judge Morris for the
District Court of Montana held that Kirkaldie’s uncounseled tribal court
convictions could not be admitted to establish an element of the offense
under the federal recidivist statute.7
Kirkaldie’s holding falls in line with Ninth Circuit precedent as
stated in United States v. Ant,8 and is a correct application of the law in
this jurisdiction. The District Court came to the right conclusion based on
the facts and the law presented to it. However, the Supreme Court of
Montana along with the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts disagree with
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Ant.9 The United States Supreme Court has
never entertained argument on this precise constitutional issue,10 but
recent decisions perpetuating a significant Circuit split may require it to
do so in the near future. Part II of this note summarizes the legal history

1
U.S. v. Kirkaldie, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2014 WL 2119860 (D. Mont. 2014). An exhaustive analysis of
this decision involves several complicated issues of Federal Indian and Constitutional law, the use of
collateral attacks upon prior convictions, Congress’s plenary authority to regulate Indian tribes,
statutory construction, and stare decisis. This short note will only focus on the validity of
uncounseled tribal court convictions, where actual imprisonment was imposed, being used as
predicate offenses in recidivist prosecutions.
2
Id. at *1.
3
Id. at *2.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at *8.
8
U.S. v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir.1989).
9
Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at **6–8.
10
State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1008 (2003); Cavanaugh
v. U.S., 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1542, (2012); Shavanaux v. U.S., 647
F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012).
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prior to U.S. v. Kirkaldie, Part III explores the differences in reasoning
among the circuits, Part IV summarizes the opinion in U.S. v. Kirkaldie,
Part V analyzes the different Circuit approaches to this issue, and Part VI
concludes the note by exploring possible consequences of the continuing
Circuit split.
II. HISTORY
A. Ninth Circuit Precedent
Ant is controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit. Ant was indicted
and charged with manslaughter in federal court and moved to suppress
evidence of a prior uncounseled guilty plea in tribal court of assault and
battery.11 Both the federal prosecution and the tribal court conviction
arose from the same alleged incident.12 Ant served a sentence of six
months in jail as a result of the tribal court conviction.13 The issue in Ant
was whether the uncounseled guilty plea, validly entered in tribal court
but which would have been unconstitutional if made in federal court,
could be admitted as evidence of guilt in the subsequent federal
prosecution involving the same acts.14 Even though Ant’s guilty plea in
tribal court was entered in accordance with tribal code and the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA), the Ninth Circuit held that acceptance of the
guilty plea violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and was not
admissible in the federal prosecution.15 The Court based its reasoning in
part on Baldasar v. Illinois,16 a case which the United States Supreme
Court explicitly overruled in U.S. v. Nichols.17
B. Supreme Court Precedent
The fractured Court in Baldasar held that an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction could not be used under an enhanced penalty
statute to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with a prison
term.18 In Nichols, the Court held that consistent with Sixth Amendment
doctrine, an uncounseled misdemeanor, valid under Scott v. Illinois19 due
to absence of incarceration, could be used to enhance punishment at a
subsequent conviction.20 The Nichols Court concluded that the right to
11

Ant, 882 F.2d at 1390.
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 1391 (emphasis added).
15
Id. at 1396.
16
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
17
U.S. v. Nichols, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
18
Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223.
19
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (Holding that actual imprisonment is the bright line test as to
when the right to counsel attaches under the Sixth Amendment).
20
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 738.
12
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counsel had not attached because no jail time was imposed in the first
proceeding.21 Baldasar and Nichols lay the foundation for Ant, yet
neither case deals specifically with the factual situation presented in Ant
or Kirkaldie.
III. EIGHTH AND TENTH CIRCUIT REASONING
The Eighth Circuit ruled on a factual situation almost identical to the
one posed in Kirkaldie in United States v. Cavanaugh.22 The District
Court determined that “the introduction of uncounseled tribal court
convictions in federal court as proof of an essential element of a federal
crime violate a defendant’s right to counsel and due process.”23 The
Eighth Circuit reversed however, deeming the Sixth Amendment
analysis inapplicable.24 In reversing, it reasoned that “the use of prior
uncounseled tribal court convictions failed to violate the federal
defendant’s right to counsel because the federal constitutional right to
appointed counsel did not apply in tribal court.”25
A mere twenty days after the decision in Cavanaugh, the Tenth
Circuit also ruled on the same factual situation in United States v.
Shavanaux.26 The Tenth Circuit also found the Sixth Amendment
analysis inapplicable to tribal court proceedings.27 In reversing the
District Court, it reasoned that based on Talton v. Mayes28 the Bill of
Rights does not apply to Indian tribes and “[t]hus, rather than being
subject to the United States Constitution, the tribal exercise of inherent
power is constrained only by the ‘supreme legislative authority of the
United States.’”29 The Tenth Circuit claimed that Ant overlooked the
Talton line of cases, and it “therefore disagree[d] with Ant’s threshold
determination that an uncounseled tribal court conviction is
constitutionally infirm.”30
The Tenth Circuit focused largely on principles of comity and due
process “to conclude that the uncounseled tribal court convictions failed
to comply with the constitution, yet simultaneously did not violate the
Constitution.”31 Absent a due process violation, the principle of comity
applies and federal courts are required to recognize tribal convictions,
21

Id.
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592.
Id. at 595.
24
Id.
25
Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at *6 (analyzing Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604–605).
26
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993.
27
Id. at 998.
28
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
29
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 997 (The Tenth Circuit, citing the holding in Talton, 163 U.S. at 364,
indicated “Congress has plenary power of Indian affairs and exercised this power by passing
ICRA.”).
30
Id. at 998.
31
Id.
22
23
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whether counseled or not.32 This is largely the reasoning of the Montana
Supreme Court as stated in State v. Spotted Eagle, 33 which the Circuit
Court opinions note.34
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT’S REASONING IN KIRKALDIE
The Government in Kirkaldie urged the District Court to abandon
Ant in favor of the reasoning of the other Circuits.35 The District Court
instead stated that “Ant remains binding law in the Ninth Circuit” and
“[t]he Court must follow precedent.”36 The court focused its analysis
upon the fact that Kirkaldie was actually incarcerated as a result of his
prior tribal court convictions, 37 because under Scott actual imprisonment
is the bright line test as to when the right to counsel attaches under the
Sixth Amendment. 38 The court reasoned “the use of evidence obtained
‘outside the Constitution’ as integral evidence in a federal prosecution
would violate Kirkaldie’s right ‘to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.’”39 In following the reasoning down the rabbit hole, the Court
offered that “[a]n issue of constitutional moment arises when an
uncounseled tribal court proceeding serves as evidence of a federal
crime. The statutory lack of counsel in a tribal court proceeding would
sustain a federal prosecution.”40
The Court recognized that it was faced with “an unpalatable
decision: dilute a defendant’s constitutional rights due to the defendant’s
membership in a sovereign tribal nation; or foreclose the prosecution of
an alleged habitual domestic violence offender due to the unique
structure of tribal courts.”41 Recognizing Congress’s “shortcoming” in
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 117,42 the court nonetheless asserted there are tribes
that “presently possess the resources to convict defendants in a manner
that would allow those convictions to be introduced properly as evidence
in federal court.”43

32

Id. at 999.
Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239.
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 999; Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604.
35
Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at *14.
36
Id. at *13.
37
Kirkaldie, supra. n. 6.
38
Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–374.
39
Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at *19.
40
Id. at *17.
41
Id.
42
Through the statute’s explicit allowance for the use of evidence obtained in violation of the
constitution to fulfill an element of the offense.
43
Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at **17–18 (The Court also addressed the supplemental jurisdiction
issue under 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) which requires that a defendant in tribal court receive all other
rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United States, including the right
to court-appointed counsel.).
33
34
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT ISSUE PRESENTED
IN KIRKALDIE
The decision reached by the District Court in Kirkaldie is supported
by the Supreme Court’s holding in Nichols. Kirkaldie was sentenced to
and actually served six months in jail as a result of his tribal court
convictions of domestic violence. Nichols’s holding was limited to
convictions valid under Scott because no imprisonment was imposed.44
Because Kirkaldie was not represented by counsel and imprisoned those
convictions were sufficiently unreliable to warrant their use to enhance
punishment in subsequent proceedings. However, the convictions being
challenged in both Baldasar and Nichols were challenged for their use at
sentencing rather than at trial, as was the attempted use in Ant. The
Eighth Circuit recognized this, and cautioned practitioners in that Circuit
that Nichols may have limited applicability to convictions being utilized
in the guilt phase as opposed to at sentencing.45 If Nichols were to apply,
the issue remains that Kirkaldie’s prior uncounseled conviction arose in
tribal court where the Sixth Amendment does not apply, as opposed to in
state or federal court where the Sixth Amendment applies.
As explored previously, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits decisions
stand for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to
tribal court proceedings.46 However, “[t]he Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel is plainly not limited to
citizens, but rather provides protection to the broader category of “the
accused.’”47 The Supreme Court has even afforded the right to effective
assistance of counsel to non-citizens48 stating, “[i]t is our responsibility
under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a
citizen or not—is left to the “mercies of incompetent counsel.”49
An interesting dichotomy emerges as enrolled Native Americans
enjoy dual-citizenship, and at all times remain citizens of both the United
States and the sovereign Indian nations. Yet “[t]ribal courts constitute the
only judicial forum in the United States where the constitutional right to
counsel does not exist for a United States citizen.”50 The District Court in
Kirkaldie concluded that the decisions reached in the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits “fail[ed] to reconcile the unique dual rights that every individual
Indian holds: the rights of a United States citizen under the United States

44

Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748 (emphasis added).
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 601 (recognizing the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the differences
between the sentencing and guilt determination phases).
46
Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at **14–15.
47
Amicus Curiae Br. of the Const. Accountability Ctr. in Support of Petrs., Chaidez v. U.S.,
http://perma.cc/BH6Y-FZ8V at **2–3 (No. 11-820, 112 S. Ct. 209 (2012)).
48
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
49
Id. at 374.
50
Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 at *10 (analyzing U.S. v. First, 731 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2013).
45
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Constitution, and the distinct rights as a tribal citizen under ICRA.”51
However, the Tenth Circuit cited Talton, which stands for the proposition
that "[w]hile Native Americans are citizens of the United States, the
United States Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes."52
The Cavanaugh Court, while ultimately disagreeing with the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Ant, concluded its opinion by stating that at best,
“Supreme Court authority in this area is unclear; reasonable decisionmakers may differ in their conclusions as to whether the Sixth
Amendment precludes a federal court's subsequent use of convictions
that are valid because and only because they arose in a court where the
Sixth Amendment did not apply.”53 This statement does not inspire
confidence that after a thorough review of the record and analysis the
Eighth Circuit reached the correct legal decision. The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel exists to ensure the reliability of convictions. Where
uncounseled convictions can be used to fulfill substantial elements of
federal crimes, the guarantee of counsel under the Sixth Amendment has
been violated. This is an admittedly difficult issue to decide because the
United States Supreme Court has not made it clear what the law is in this
area.
VI. CONCLUSION
The arbitrary legal difference between the Circuit approaches to this
issue can lead to other negative consequences for Native American
defendants. For example, the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians
(TMBCI) Reservation sits in Rolette County, North Dakota, which is in
the Eighth Circuit. However, a large number of off-reservation Turtle
Mountain trust lands sit in Montana,54 which is in the Ninth Circuit. This
situation could lead to the same individual committing the same offense
in North Dakota and Montana being treated entirely differently in federal
courts sitting in the respective Circuits, which are geographically less
than 500 miles apart.
This issue, made difficult because of the unique status of the
defendant, requires a District Court judge sitting in the Ninth Circuit to
wrestle with a difficult policy decision. By adhering to precedent, an
alleged habitual domestic violence offender can walk out of federal court
unpunished. By abandoning and reversing precedent, a U.S. citizen
deprived of the right to counsel will have an uncounseled conviction
used to fulfill an element of a federal offense. The vitality of Ant is
currently being litigated in Montana in three cases involving the use of
51

Id. at *16 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI and 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6)).
Talton, 163 U.S. at 384.
53
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605 (emphasis added).
54
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Information on Chippewa Indians:
Turtle Mountain Reservation, http://perma.cc/3YLB-K2UV (accessed Sept. 16, 2014).
52
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uncounseled tribal court convictions as predicate offenses under
§ 117(a),55 and oral argument was heard in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals sitting in Portland in July of 2014 in United States v. Bryant.56
The Government continues to urge the Ninth Circuit to overrule Ant, and
to adopt law similar to that of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and the
Montana Supreme Court, while criminal defendants remain adamant that
the use of uncounseled convictions as evidence in federal court is an
impermissible Sixth Amendment violation.
After hearing oral argument in Bryant, the Ninth Circuit will revisit
its decision in Ant and will likely affirm its vitality. This is an area ripe
for review by the Supreme Court in order to provide both conformity and
clarity to an increasingly confusing body of law. It is the job of the
nation’s highest court to instruct the lower courts on what the law is, and
they should choose to do so here. Absent a direct ruling from the
Supreme Court, there is no reason for the Ninth Circuit to abandon
precedent and adopt the reasoning of other Circuit courts.

55
U.S. v. Kirkaldie, 2014 WL 2119860 (9th Cir. May 22, 2014); Or. Granting Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss the Indictment, United States v. Stewart, https://ecf.mtd.uscourts.gov/doc1/11111509947
(D. Mont. May 22, 2014) (CR 14-20-BLG-SPW, available on PACER); Oral Argument Audiofile,
United States v. Bryant, http://perma.cc/99EC-KFMR (July 10, 2014) (No. 12-30177).
56
Oral Argument Audiofile, U.S. v. Bryant, http://perma.cc/99EC-KFMR (July 10, 2014) (No. 1230177).

